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HR 2056 IH
106th
CONGRESS
1st
Session
H. R.
2056
To establish United States Government policy regarding the
necessity of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military,
security, intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the
restoration of Lebanon's independence.
IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 8, 1999
Mr. FORBES introduced the following bill; which
was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in
addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Banking and
Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as
fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A
BILL
To establish United States Government policy regarding the
necessity of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military,
security, intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the
restoration of Lebanon's independence.
Be it enacted by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited
as the `Lebanon Independence Restoration Act of 1999'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the
following findings:
(1) The people of
Lebanon have a rich, proud, and honorable history dating from
biblical times to the present, and Lebanon has been a free and
democratic nation for much of its modern history.
(2) Lebanon and the
United States have enjoyed a history of friendship and cooperation
which has been witnessed by the immigration of millions of Lebanese
to the United States where they and their descendants have
contributed greatly to the fabric of American life.
(3) Lebanon witnessed
foreign incursions and occupations during its 15-year civil war.
Although that war ended in 1990, non-Lebanese forces still control
much of the country. These forces include an Israeli force that
controls a 9-mile wide security zone in Lebanon contiguous with
Israel's northern border, and approximately 30,000 Syrian troops,
several armed Palestinian factions, and other terrorist groups that
control the remainder of the country.
(4) There is a crucial
distinction between the presence of Syrian and Israeli military
forces in Lebanon. Israel exercises no control over the Government
of Lebanon and in 1998 offered to withdraw unilaterally from the
security zone in return for security guarantees, whereas Syria has
never recognized Lebanon's independence, or exchanged ambassadors
with Lebanon, and effectively dictates the major policies and
actions of the Government of Lebanon.
(5) Various Lebanese
factions signed a peace settlement in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989 as
a step toward ending the civil war. This accord provided for the
phased redeployment and withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon
beginning in 1992.
(6) The Government of
Syria has refused to carry out any redeployment as envisioned by the
Taif Accord. Syrian domination over Lebanese politics and political
leaders is at the root of the Lebanese Government's failure to press
Syria for a withdrawal of Syria's occupying forces.
(7) In addition to its
armed forces, Syria maintains a massive intelligence service
presence in Lebanon to enforce its control over the Lebanese
people.
(8) Syrian domination is
so pervasive that Lebanon has effectively become a Syrian satellite
state. This relationship with Syria does not reflect the will of the
majority of the Lebanese public. Moreover, Syria has sought to
change Lebanon's demographic balance by the population transfer of
as many as 1,000,000 Syrian laborers to Lebanon.
(9) Syrian domination
has prevented Lebanon from developing direct contacts with Israel
and participating in the multilateral track of the Middle East peace
process.
(10) Syrian domination
has been associated with a deterioration in Lebanon's human rights
situation. Syria has engineered Lebanese election results to its
liking, Syrian intelligence units have been implicated in the
disappearance of Lebanese citizens, and the Syrian-controlled
Lebanese Parliament has imposed curbs on Lebanon's media, once the
freest in the Arab world.
(11) Syrian domination
has failed to curtail international narcotics traffickers or
terrorist groups, including Hizballah and the Kurdish Workers Party,
that operate in Lebanon under Syrian control.
(12) Syrian domination
has prevented the Lebanese Army from entering southern Lebanon to
restore order and stability in that region. Consequently, southern
Lebanon has been a staging area for military provocations against
Israel by terrorist groups supported by Syria and Iran.
(13) The United States
Congress is concerned about the potential for a miscalculation
between Israel and Syria that could inadvertently lead to
large-scale hostilities, especially in southern Lebanon. In this
regard the Congress views with grave concern Syria's acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological
weapons and missile delivery systems. Syrian surface-to-surface
missiles can reach major urban centers in Israel, Turkey, and
Jordan.
(14) The United States
Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in resolutions that insist
that Syria make good on its commitments to withdraw its military and
security forces from Lebanon.
(15) It is not in the
interest of the United States that freedom and democracy depart
irreversibly from Lebanon. Lebanon has a constructive role to play
in the search for Middle East peace. It can only do so when it is
free, sovereign, and governed by a truly representative
government.
(16) The withdrawal of
Syrian and other foreign forces from Lebanon would not only promote
regional stability, but also would create the necessary conditions
for the restoration of Lebanon's independence, freedom, and
democracy. Truly free elections are not possible with the presence
of foreign military and security forces and terrorist groups in
Lebanon.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The Congress calls for
the following:
(1) A complete,
immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Syrian military,
intelligence, and security forces and their proxies and all
Palestinian and other terrorist forces from Lebanon, to be followed
by the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces.
(2) Following the
withdrawals described in paragraph (1) and restoration of a freely
elected, democratic government in Lebanon, the deployment of the
Lebanese Army to southern Lebanon to restore order and stability in
that region, and for disbanding all armed groups in Lebanon with the
exception of the legitimate national armed forces.
(3) At the same time as
the deployment described in paragraph (2), the assurance by the
Government of Lebanon for the safety and well-being of all members
of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL.
It is the sense of the
Congress that the United States should not ratify or in any other
way affirm, support, recognize, or participate in any peace
agreement between Syria and Israel that does not provide for the
full and verifiable withdrawal of Syrian military, intelligence, and
security forces and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 5. WITHDRAWAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR IMPORTS
FROM SYRIA AND LEBANON.
(a) WITHDRAWAL-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except subsection (b)),
nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) shall
not apply with respect to any goods that--
(1) are the product of
Syria or Lebanon; and
(2) are entered into the
customs territory of the United States on or after the 15th day
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) RESTORATION OF
NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT- The President may restore
nondiscriminatory treatment to goods that--
(1) are the product of
Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces and
their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon
and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely
elected and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) are the product of
Syria beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that the requirements described in paragraph (1) have been
met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have been
freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 6. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND
LEBANON.
(a) PROHIBITION-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, economic assistance may
not be provided to Syria or Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION-
Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to
Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces and
their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon
and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely
elected and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to
Syria beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that the requirements described in paragraph (1) have been
met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have been
freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
(c) ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE- In this section, the term `economic assistance' means
any assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or any related assistance under any other
provision of law.
SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON.
(a) PROHIBITION-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, military assistance may
not be provided to the Government of Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION-
Subsection (a) shall not apply beginning 30 days after the President
certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, security, and
intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon have been
completely withdrawn from Lebanon and the Government of Lebanon is
certified to have been freely elected and wholly democratic in
nature.
(c) SENSE OF THE
CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that any assistance
prohibited by reason of the application of subsection (a) should be
redirected to assistance for humanitarian, democracy building, human
rights and educational efforts in Lebanon.
(d) MILITARY
ASSISTANCE- In this section, the term `military assistance'--
(1) means any assistance
under part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2301
et seq.) and any assistance under the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); and
(2) includes any other
form of military cooperation with the Government of Lebanon.
SEC. 8. REQUIREMENT TO OPPOSE LOANS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO
SYRIA AND LEBANON BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) REQUIREMENT-
Beginning 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall instruct the United States representative to each
international financial institution (including the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development) to which the United States is a member to use the voice
and vote of the United States to oppose the initiation or renewal of
any loan or other form of assistance for Syria or Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION-
Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to
Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces and
their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon
and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely
elected and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to
Syria beginning 30 days after the President certifies to the
Congress that the requirements described in paragraph (1) have been
met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have been
freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORTS.
As part of the annual
human rights report required under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)),
the Secretary of State shall pay special attention to the report on
Lebanon and shall include in such report the following:
(1) A detailed
assessment of Syrian influence in the three branches of the
Government of Lebanon.
(2) An assessment of
human rights abuses attributable to Syrian influence in the
Government of Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of the
role played by Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon.
(4) An estimate of the
number of Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces and
their proxies and terrorist groups in Lebanon.
(5) Progress made by the
Government of Lebanon in disarming terrorist groups, and an
assessment of the causes for the Lebanese Government's failure to
disarm such groups.
(6) The specific steps
and concrete actions taken by the Department of State to affect a
withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces
and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 10. DEFINITION.
As used in this Act,
the term `Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces and
their proxies' includes Syrian Army regulars, paramilitary forces,
and plain clothes intelligence and security officials.
END
H.R.2056
Sponsor: Rep Forbes. Michael P. (introduced
6/8/1999)
Latest Major Action: 6/25/1999 Referred to House
subcommittee
Title: To establish United States Government policy
regarding the necessity of requiring the full withdrawal of all
Syrian military, security, intelligence and proxy forces from
Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's independence.
COSPONSORS(12):
Rep Salmon, Matt - 6/16/1999
Rep
McIntosh, David M. - 6/16/1999
Rep LaHood, Ray - 6/16/1999
(withdrawn - 6/25/1999)
Rep Hayworth, J. D. - 6/22/1999
Rep
Cook, Merrill - 6/22/1999
Rep Saxton, Jim - 6/22/1999
Rep
Shows, Ronnie - 6/22/1999
Rep Towns, Edolphus - 7/1/1999
Rep
Maloney, James H. - 7/12/1999
Rep Souder, Mark E. - 7/12/1999
Rep English, Phil - 7/14/1999
Rep Cannon, Chris - 7/14/1999
Rep Andrews, Robert E. - 8/4/1999
STATUS:
6/8/1999:
Referred to the Committee on
International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways
and Means, and Banking and Financial Services, for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of
the committee concerned.
6/8/1999:
Referred to House
International Relations
6/8/1999:
Referred to House Ways and
Means
6/8/1999:
Referred to House Banking and Financial
Services
6/25/1999:
Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic
and International Monetary Policy.
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